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Theme: In March 2008 the Prime Minister presented in Parliament the National Security 
Strategy of the United Kingdom, a plan that includes counter-terrorist and civil 
contingencies dimensions. 
 
 
Summary: The UK’s first National Security Strategy (UK NSS, published in March 2008) 
which covers what are now recognised as the much expanded inter-connected domains 
of internal and external security is critically reviewed as a belated response to the ‘new 
security agenda’ (Buzan, 1983). The analysis uses Edwards (2007) set of key questions 
as a framework to examine prioritisation, inter-agency response integration, risk 
awareness and management, response leadership and accountability. The analysis notes 
that, despite the breadth of issue coverage in the UK NSS, the strategy is currently very 
heavily weighted in both focus and content detail towards the counter-terrorism strategy 
(‘Contest’) both as a priority issue area and as offering transferable ‘best practice’ to some 
non counter-terrorist (CT) issue areas. This ARI paper will, first, highlight the CT aspects 
of the NSS, secondly, identify the wider but related civil contingencies aspects of the NSS 
and, thirdly, focus on issues of UK NSS implementation and accountability. 
 
 
 
Analysis: For much of the post-World War II era the concept and promulgation of a 
specifically titled ‘national security strategy’ has been very much symbolised by US 
practice following its post-WWII National Security Act. By contrast, recent UK practice, in 
a more fragmented fashion, was to have a ‘foreign policy’, a ‘defence policy’ and since 
2003 a specific ‘counter-terrorism’ strategy, known as ‘Contest’ and an updated civil 
emergencies framework set out in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. 
 
Within UK government policy and practice it had long been customary to refer to ‘national 
security’ mainly in the context of threats from foreign powers to the security of Britain as a 
state. The term is also used in a more narrow sense to refer to the objectives of the duties 
of the UK’s security and intelligence services (MI5, MI6, GCHQ and the police Special 
Branches). However, the publication, in March 2008, of the UK’s first ‘National Security 
Strategy’ (UK NSS) acknowledges that ‘Over recent decades, our view of national security 
has broadened to include threats to individual citizens and to our way of life, as well as to 
the integrity and interests of the state’.1 In many ways the UK NSS seems to be a belated 
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high-level recognition that contemporary security concerns go beyond the traditional 
confines of ‘hard security’ and now encompass ‘soft security’ areas such as trans-national 
crime, the environment and terrorism, which were identified in the 1980s by Buzan and 
others2 and often called the ‘new security agenda’. Prior to the publication of the UK NSS, 
these new security concerns were gradually permeating, in a rather ad hoc fashion, UK 
defence policy and the emerging updated policies on civil contingencies. For example, in 
2002 the UK’s Strategic Defence Review’s ‘New Chapter’ made specific reference to the 
military’s contribution to counter-terrorism (CT). 
 
In the wider EU context the UK NSS is one among a number of such policy documents 
now being produced by EU Member States. In particular, the 2004 and 2007 entrants 
have seen their alignment to NATO and EU policy requirements as necessitating the 
development of a specific and wide-ranging NSS under the provisions of their 
constitutional law. For example, the Polish Government’s National Security Strategy 
(2007) refers to the fact that its goals are derived from the articulation of its national 
interests in the Polish Constitution. Hungary describes its NSS as deriving from 
Resolution No. 94/1998(XII.29) of the Hungarian National Assembly on ‘The Basic 
Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of the Republic of Hungary’ which makes 
the Hungarian Government responsible for the National Security Strategy and National 
Military Strategy.3 Moreover, Hungary states that its NSS is in line with NATO’s 1999 
strategic concept and the EU’s European Security Strategy. These approaches to a 
national security strategy can be seen as a sort of gründnorm-based approach. 
 
By contrast the UK appears to have adopted, by the production of its first NSS, a sort of 
ex post facto rationalisation based upon the existence of a number of existing discrete 
initiatives, such as the ‘Contest’ CT strategy. It might also be seen as part of the Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown’s attempts to foster a greater political and public consensus on 
CT, than was achieved by Tony Blair, by placing the CT response within a wider 
framework of security concerns.4 These wider concerns are expressed as follows in the 
NSS: 
 
‘The Cold War threat has been replaced by a diverse but interconnected set of threats 
and risks, which affect the United Kingdom directly and also have the potential to 
undermine wider international political stability. They include international terrorism, 
weapons of mass destruction, conflicts and failed states, pandemics, and trans-national 
crime. These and other threats and risks are driven by a diverse set of underlying factors, 
including climate change, competition for energy, poverty and poor governance, 
demographic changes and globalisation’ (UK NSS, para 1.3). 
 
The aim of the NSS, in the above context is said to be ‘to set out how we will address and 
manage this diverse though interconnected set of security challenges and underlying 
drivers’ (UK NSS, para 1.4). Moreover, all the NSSs of the EU Member States referred to, 
recognise the clear interrelationship of the domains of internal and external security and 
that their issue content goes far beyond the traditional confines of military conflict or 
terrorism. 
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strategy in R. Bossong, ‘The Action Plan on Combating Terrorism: A Flawed Instrument of EU Security 
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In February 2007 the UK think-tank Demos published a report titled ‘The Case for a 
National Security Strategy’, which focused on the situation in the UK.5 The Report 
suggested a number of criteria by which an NSS could be evaluated. These points, 
together with some other critiques of the UK NSS which have been produced since its 
publication, will be used to provide the critical framework for this paper. Drawing on the 
risks associated ‘with the lack of a holistic approach by government to national security’, 
identified as a generic problem in a Dutch official review, the Demos Report suggested 
that the UK NSS should be assessed from the perspective of its possible contribution to 
resolving the following issues: 
 
• Does the NSS offer the prospect for developing a more integrated response 
framework? 
• Does it adequately provide for mechanisms to recognise and raise awareness of 
the early signs of new threats or hazards? 
• Does it recognise and seek to address any deficiencies in risk analysis and risk 
identification? 
• Does it contain a clearly thought out method of prioritisation? 
• Does it offer an adequate leadership model? 
 
This ARI concentrates primarily on the CT aspects but also discusses the CT aspects 
within a wider UK civil contingencies response context, which was most recently set out in 
the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. This paper will, first, highlight the CT aspects of the 
NSS, secondly, identify the wider but related civil contingencies aspect of the NSS and, 
thirdly, focus on issues of UK NSS implementation and accountability. 
 
Under its ‘Guiding Principles’ the UK NSS states: 
 
‘At home, our aim should be that people are able to go about their business without fear 
and with reasonable assurance of safety. Some risk is inevitable, and the Government’s 
role is to minimise and anticipate it… In a wider interdependent world, we cannot opt out 
of overseas engagement. But overseas especially we need to be realistic, and set realistic 
expectations, about what we can achieve’ (UK NSS, para 2.2). 
 
The UK NSS, CT and the Wider Security Agenda: A Blueprint for Prioritisation and an 
Integrated Response Framework? 
In a sense, the way the NSS is written suggests by both textual space allocation and 
order of issue treatment that the ‘method of prioritisation’ is almost solely defined by a 
form of Prime Ministerial-led political agenda from Blair to Brown that places CT as the top 
priority. In this context, one can suggest that this prioritisation also reflects the influence of 
‘Contest’ and recent national security reforms such as the setting up of the Joint Terrorism 
Analysis Centre (JTAC), the establishment of the Office of Security and Counter- 
Terrorism (OSCT) within the Home Office and the provision of a new single Security and 
Intelligence budget, which all serve to privilege the packaging of information on the 
terrorism threat to Ministers, in both its wider and narrower meanings. By contrast, no 
similar high-profile strategies or organisational changes are to be found relating to, for 
example, climate change. Moreover, in its itemisation of national security reforms since 
2001 it is noteworthy that six of the items relate to CT, one relates to trans-national 
organised crime and none relate to other new concerns like pandemics and flooding, that 
also appear in the UK NSS. Indeed, it is also rather surprising that the major piece of 
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general underpinning legislation relating to many aspects of the ‘new security agenda’ 
including terrorism, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, is not given grater prominence 
whilst the CT legal process is accorded a bullet point of its own in the UK NSS. 
 
Indeed, the Government seems to see its developing multi-sector approach to CT as a 
model capable of wider application in the national security sphere. The NSS states that 
the Government ‘will build on the coalition of public, private and third sectors already 
involved in counter-terrorism… [and] work with owners or operators to protect critical sites 
and essential services; with businesses to improve resilience; with local authorities and 
communities to plan for emergencies and to counter violent extremism’ (UK NSS, para 
2.5). Moreover, in the specific identification of ‘Security Challenges’, whilst terrorism; 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), trans-national organised crime and global instability 
and conflict receive separate sections, everything else is lumped under ‘civil 
emergencies’. Under ‘civil emergencies’ we are told that the Government monitors ‘closely 
the risks of infectious disease, extreme weather, and man-made emergencies’ (UK NSS, 
para 3.22). In one sense, this is an oddly disjointed series of listings because two of the 
civil emergencies can be related to climate change, which the Government later 
recognises as ‘potentially the greatest challenge to global security and stability’ (UK NSS, 
para 3.34). Moreover, to add further confusion in terms of priority, in his Statement to the 
House of Commons on the NSS, Brown, referring to security challenges to UK citizens, 
there states that ‘the most serious and urgent remains the threat from international 
terrorism ’.6 
 
In summary, the UK NSS does not contain or even refer to a clear methodology for NSS 
issue prioritisation. Although, as Feakin notes,7 it does recognise ‘interconnectivity’ in its 
widest senses in relation to threats, risks and drivers and modes of governance response, 
he sees the NSS as the ‘genesis of pan-governmental joined up thinking on security’. 
However, UK governance is littered with recognitions of the need for inter-agency working 
and evidence of the failures to implement these requirements, as Cornish notes: ‘Cross-
governmental policy initiatives are fraught with difficulty, and often only survive at the 
lowest level of the lowest common policy denominator’.8 A good example of this problem 
of cross-governmental policy delivery is provided by the implementation implications of 
the Prime Minister’s statement that the Home Secretary and Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government will be reporting on additional measures ‘that we 
propose for young people in colleges and universities, in prisons and working in faith 
communities to disrupt the promoters of violent extremism, all building on the support of 
the vast majority of people of all faiths and all backgrounds who condemn terrorism’. 
These proposed measures imply the provision of integrated working by a very diverse 
collection of public sector and private sector policy actors. 
 
Risk/Threat Awareness: Analysis and Management 
In general, the UK NSS is all about ‘issue awareness’, as it devotes much space to 
identifying all the currently conceivable risks, threats and challenges. However, none of 
the three terms in italics are actually defined in the NSS and they seem to be used in a 
                                                 
6 Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Statement to the House of Commons, ‘National Security Strategy’, House of 
Commons Hansard Debates, 19/III/2008, cols. 925-929, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2000708/cmhansard/cm0821319/debtext/80, accessed 9/IV/2008. 
7 T. Feakin, ‘The National Security Strategy – The Golden Thread of Interconnectivity’, RUSI, 2008. 
8 P. Cornish, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom – How Radical Can it Be?’, Experts’ 
Comment Chatham House, 26/III/2008, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/media/comment/nss/, accessed 
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rather random fashion in the text, although Endnote 3 does refer to the meanings of the 
five national threat levels in relation to a possible terrorist attack. Elsewhere, for example, 
trans-national crime, pandemics and flooding are described as both threats and 
challenges. Thus a number of commentators, including the Conservative Party leader, 
David Cameron, have described the NSS as more of a ‘list’ in relation to the issues raised 
rather than a clear strategy to tackle the issue.9 In one sense, therefore, NSS does show 
quite a good issue awareness, but that is only at a very basic level, for instance, 
discussions of rising energy demands and population pressures. In the NSS, 
assessments of responses, in terms of the identification, analysis and managements of 
issues which might be variously classed as threats, risks or challenges, show a variability 
of depth of response across what are called the major security challenges. This is shown 
in the sections below. 
 
• In counter-terrorism, reference is made to: organisational structures such as 
JTAC, the multi-departmental Research, Information and Communications Unit 
(RICU), the OSCT, the ‘Contest’ (4Ps) Strategy and the CT & Intelligence budget, 
while a six-point ‘future priorities’ programme is identified. 
• In countering the WMD threat, reference is made to: an approach that is ‘fully 
integrated across Government’ (UK NSS, para 4.16) and involves working with 
partners outside the UK and in the private sector. The approach is described by 
four ‘Ds’ (Dissuade, Detect, Deny and Defend) and has a six-point ‘future priorities’ 
programme. 
• In tackling trans-national organised crime, reference is made to: rising police 
numbers, the recent formation of the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) 
and the Borders and Immigration Agency (BIA) and adapting ‘Multi-Agency Public 
Protection Arrangements’ (UK NSS, para 4.28) from their original usage in tackling 
sexual and violent offenders to target organised crime and this challenge has a 
four point ‘future priorities’ programme. 
• In tackling global instability, conflict and failed and fragile states, reference is made 
to: the optimum of a multilateral approach, the need for ‘early and continuing 
analysis and understanding’, a strengthened UK capacity to monitor effects of UK 
actions and ‘more systematically learn the lessons of our experience’ (UK NSS, 
para 4.39). In other respects, the response is more ‘case-by-case’, for example, 
the new 2007 UK strategy for Afghanistan and a three-year commitment of £243 
million to security and economic stability in the Occupied Palestine Territories. 
Future funding is smaller than for CT, with £269 million in a Stabilisation Aid Fund 
supported by a Stabilisation Unit drawn from the Foreign, Defence and Overseas 
Development Ministries and a three-year £327 million Conflict Prevention Pool 
managed jointly by the same Ministries. This challenge has a six-point ‘future 
priorities’ programme attached to it but these are very general, for example: 
‘building the capacity of weak states and regional organisations to prevent and 
resolve conflicts’ (UK NSS, p. 61). 
• In planning for civil emergencies and resilience, reference is made to: the 
response framework set out in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004; a nationwide 
resilience network coordinated by the Cabinet Office; assessing, planning and 
building capacity to tackle flooding (reference is made to the Pitt Review on the 
2007 floods)10 and pandemics in the UK; and the publication, in 2008, of a 
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national-level risk register and a review and possible strengthening of the 2004 
Civil Contingencies Act. These matters are all reflected in a five-point ‘future 
priorities programme’. 
 
By contrast, the challenges of ‘tackling climate change’, ‘tackling energy security’ and 
‘tackling poverty, inequality, and poor governance’ are much less well articulated in terms 
of response, although reference is made, for example, to a systematic and detailed 
analysis of climate change effects on the UK (with £100 million for research over five 
years) and reference is made to an ‘integrated energy strategy’ that, however, has an 
extremely broad agenda, much of which is outside the UK’s direct control (UK NSS, paras 
4.89-4.90). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Does the UK NSS Offer a Clear Leadership Model Over the Range of Identified Issues? 
The UK NSS and associated documentation11 at present offers a leadership model that is 
currently rather heavily weighted towards the more traditional understandings of security 
and counter-terrorism. At the top is the National Security Committee set up in 2007 and 
chaired by the Prime Minister, but one can question how this will relate in non-defence or 
terrorism areas to the ‘lead department’ model for risk identification, analysis and 
response as set out in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. A Centre for the Protection of 
National Infrastructure (CPNI) was established in 2007 as an interdepartmental 
organisation but its remit is again weighted as it only provides ‘advice on information, 
physical and personnel security to businesses and organisations across the national 
infrastructure’ (UK NSS, para 4.106). Although the Government plans to give the 
Intelligence and Security Committee of parliamentarians a more public and enhanced 
scrutiny role, its remit still remains focussed on the more traditional security areas of 
espionage, WMD threats and terrorism. 
 
The structures and systems necessary to address the full range of ‘new security agenda’ 
challenges identified in the UK NSS are, as yet, much more embryonic in form. Thus we 
are told in the UK NSS that: 
 
• Cabinet secretariats are being reviewed to improve organisation working 
coherence and effectiveness across government –but this is a goal that has been 
stated many times before: is it deliverable?–. 
• Still in the consideration stage is an aspiration to look at how to strengthen ‘the 
Government’s capacity for horizon-scanning, forward-planning and early warning 
to identify, measure, and monitor risks and threats’. 
• A national security forum is planned with a membership drawn from ‘business, 
academics, community organisations and military and security experts from 
outside Government’ to advise the National Security Committee but, as yet, there 
are no details of its remit or structure. 
• A National Risk Register, updated annually, is planned. 
 
A key requirement in respect of this wide-agenda NSS and its accompanying systems is a 
mechanism to hold Government accountable for the implementation of this ambitious 
strategy. At present this would depend upon the rather disparate scrutiny practices of 
Commons’ departmental select committees and the reviews carried out by the Commons’ 
                                                 
11 See Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s ‘Statement on Security’ to Parliament of 25/VII/2007. 
Area: Security & Defence 
ARI 74/2008 
Date: 4/7/2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 7
Public Accounts Committee on the basis of reports from the National Audit Office. 
However, the UK NSS does hold out the prospect of the creation of a ‘joint Parliamentary 
National Security Committee to help monitor the implementation and development of this 
strategy’ (UK NSS, p. 60). At present, as Cornish has pointed out, the UK NSS has too 
much description in its content. We await the articulation of a much more specific strategy 
for implementation for which the Government can be held accountable, in their spheres of 
responsibility, for matters such as the fact that over 4,000 UK households are still in 
temporary accommodation after the summer 2007 floods. This represents a degree of 
human suffering that would have received much higher political and public attention had it 
been terrorist-related. 
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